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Abstract—The popularity and applicability of mobile crowd-
sensing applications are continuously increasing due to the
widespread of mobile devices and their sensing and processing
capabilities. However, we need to offer appropriate incentives to
the mobile users who contribute their resources and preserve
their privacy. Blockchain technologies enable semi-anonymous
multi-party interactions and can be utilized in crowdsensing
applications to maintain the privacy of the mobile users while
ensuring first-rate crowdsensed data. In this work, we propose to
use blockchain technologies and smart contracts to orchestrate
the interactions between mobile crowdsensing providers and
mobile users for the case of spatial crowdsensing, where mobile
users need to be at specific locations to perform the tasks.
Smart contracts, by operating as processes that are executed
on the blockchain, are used to preserve users’ privacy and make
payments. Furthermore, for the assignment of the crowdsensing
tasks to the mobile users, we design a truthful, cost-optimal
auction that minimizes the payments from the crowdsensing
providers to the mobile users. Extensive experimental results
show that the proposed privacy preserving auction outperforms
state-of-the-art proposals regarding cost by ten times for high
numbers of mobile users and tasks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The wide dissemination of smartphones that are pro-
grammable and employed with sensors gave birth to crowd-
sensing applications such as environment monitoring, mobile
social recommendations, public safety and others. Mobile
crowdsensing is a paradigm that utilizes the ubiquitousness of
the mobile users who are carrying smartphones and can col-
lect and process data. Crowsensing Service Providers (CSPs)
request sensing tasks to mobile users (MUs) who deliver
these tasks in order to get paid. Crowdsensing tasks can be
categorized based on characteristics inherent to the tasks or
the participants1. Two usual dimensions are event based vs.
continuous, and spatial vs. non-spatial. These dimensions are
independent of each other, and any combination is possible.
In this work, we focus on event-based spatial crowdsensing
tasks that are associated with geographic locations where the
mobile users perform them [1], [2]. The challenges are two-
fold: (i) the mobile users are sensitive about the secrecy of their
locations and may not participate to avoid any leakage. Also,
they may even try to spoof their locations to avoid the cost of
moving the required locations. (ii) A second challenge is the
calculation of the payments to MUs for their participation.
The participation cost of each user is private information and
1We are using the terms ”mobile users” and ”participants” interchangeably
and depending on the context.
depends on several factors. As a consequence, mobile users
are motivated to misreport their actual costs to obtain higher
payment, and hence incentives are needed. Truthful auctions
are designed in such a way to force participants to report
their true participation cost. This feature enables optimal task
assignment to the participants in such a way to minimize the
payments to the employed mobile users [3].
We consider participants who are not willing to reveal
their identities and locations regardless of the number of the
tasks they have delivered. Although Internet service providers
(ISPs) are aware of users’ identities and locations, they are
not allowed to reveal them to third-parties [4]. We propose to
use the capabilities of ISPs supplemented by smart contracts
over blockchains to design a system for privacy-preserving
crowdsensing that minimizes CSPs’ cost. We propose a model
where CSPs send crowdsensing requests to an ISP who trans-
forms them into tasks and runs a cost-optimal auction to the
suitable cells to allow the MUs on these cells to express their
interest in the tasks via truthful bidding. The ISP is assisted
by a blockchain, similar to Ethereum [5] and Hawk [6] or
Hyperledger Fabric [7]. To build such crowdsensing system,
we address the following questions:
Q1: How to ensure a CSP that the data has been submitted
by users at the indicated locations?
Q2: How to preserve the privacy of mobile users from CSPs,
even if they have submitted location-specific data?
Q3: How to assign crowdsensing tasks to mobile users who
are interested in subsets of tasks in a cost-optimal way
and incentivize them to report their costs truthfully?
For Q1 and Q2, we leverage the confidentiality assurance
from ISPs. ISPs guarantee the execution of CSPs’ tasks at the
desired locations. To build such trust across CSPs, ISPs, and
MUs, we use a blockchain and smart contracts. To address
Q3 we design an auction using game theory.
Why blockchain? Blockchain is a distributed mechanism
that stores data in the form of transactions and can offer
additional functionalities such as transactional privacy and
smart contracts. It is maintained by interconnected nodes that
are responsible for securing the network, and keeping everyone
in the system in sync. Anyone interested in maintaining a
blockchain, and, as a consequence, in having access to the
stored data can partake. Blockchains have been used in mobile
environments such as for automated payments between mobile
devices in cooperative application execution scenarios [8]
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Fig. 1: The examined ecosystem. A blockchain is maintained by (i) the ISP and (ii) anyone else interested in the stored data.
Smart contracts are used to coordinate the interactions between the ISP, the CSPs and the mobile users.
and for enabling small payments between mobile users in
environments without internet connectivity [9].
In our scenario, we use the cellular access points of the
ISP network to maintain a blockchain, but we assume that
anyone (e.g., the CSPs) can participate. Transactional privacy
guarantees that the identity of the creator of one transaction
cannot be revealed. This functionality is used to hide users’
identities. Smart contracts are software processes that are
executed whenever a transaction is calling them when it is
added to the blockchain. Ethereum allows any application to
be deployed, using smart contracts, on the blockchain [5], [10].
For a smart contract to be executed, a certain amount of credits
has to be transferred to their address. We use this feature to
enforce payments. Blockchains are more preferable to servers
for various reasons. First of all, they are open and append-only
mechanisms that can guarantee that the stored data can not be
modified. This feature guarantees the integrity of the stored
data. Second, the use of the smart contracts allows anyone to
examine the validity of the produced outcomes [11].
Figure 1 shows the examined architecture and the participat-
ing entities (CSPs, ISP, MUs). Cellular towers can estimate,
with high accuracy, the current location of each user and for
that reason, we assume that a cell can be further split into
smaller areas to allow the submission of crowdsensing requests
with high granularity. The ISP employs smart contracts to (i)
give access to CSPs to the collected data they requested, (ii)
preserve the privacy of mobile users, (iii) run auctions, (iv) pay
mobile users and (v) get paid by the CSPs. This means that the
trinity of CSPs, mobile users and the ISP interact with each
other using smart contracts that are stored and executed in the
blockchain. In summary, our contributions are the following:
Contributions: We address the problem of privacy preserv-
ing crowdsensing in a cost-optimal way by proposing the use
of an ISP as the intermediary between CSPs and mobile users.
ISP uses smart contracts over a blockchain to preserve the
privacy of mobile users while ensuring the validity of their
locations. As far as incentives for mobile user participation,
we have designed a truthful, computationally efficient auction,
called CSOPT. The cost-effectiveness of CSOPT is compared
with a state-of-the-art algorithm, and the performance of the
proposed smart contracts is depicted using Ethereum.
II. RELATED WORK
Mobile users are motivated to spoof their location to pre-
serve their privacy and potentially decrease their execution
cost [12], [13], [14]. Privacy concerns might even discourage
users from participating. Depending on the type of a task,
the potential privacy breach changes. For example, a task that
requires an MU to report the time needed to travel from one
location to another by traveling at the time of the request,
might lead to the disclosure of their current location and
potentially sensitive addresses or even their identity through
location-based attacks [15]. In the case of frequent participa-
tion, even if participants are using pseudonyms, their trajectory
might reveal their sensitive locations or commutes [16] and
even eventually disclose their identities [17].
Although there is high research activity on mobile crowd-
sensing, neither blockchain nor smart contracts have been used
in the existing proposals, to the best of our knowledge. Pro-
posed crowdsensing architectures are composed of a mobile
application and a server that is responsible for the collection
and processing of the sensed data. Localized analytics on the
mobile devices are often performed to preserve users’ privacy
and reduce the amount of the data sent to the server [18].
Furthermore, similar to the deployment of smart contracts in
the orchestration of the crowdsensing process, the authors of
[19] develop Medusa, a framework to develop crowdsensing
applications. However, the authors consider a crowdsensing
application provider that is using cloud resources and do not
provide any privacy guarantees to the mobile users. Similarly
to this work the authors of [20] propose the ungearing of the
crowdsensing provider from the physical resources that are
responsible for the data gathering and processing. However
they consider cloud infrastructure providers for that role,
who do not provide any privacy guarantees. Liu et. al. [21]
consider the employment of a network provider to handle the
crowdsensing process but they do not consider an auction in
the determination of the users’ cost since they assume that the
ISP will determine the credits each MU gets.
In our proposal the MUs are paid based on their costs and
for which we rely on auctions. A cost optimal auction is an
auction that minimizes the expected payments of the CSP
subject to feasibility constraints [22]. In his seminal work,
Myerson [22] introduces the notion of optimal auction and
designs one for selling a single unit of a single item. Our
case is multiple units of multiple items (homogeneous but
location specific tasks and hence we refer to it as multiple
items). In economic terms, it falls under the category of
multi-unit combinatorial auctions, which is in general hard to
solve. Optimal multiple items auctions have been proposed for
specific settings. For example, Cai et. al. [23] consider additive
value settings. Iyengar and Kumar [24] design an optimal
multi-unit but single item auction. Mechanism design theory
has been used for crowdsensing to design incentives [25],
[26], [27]. Koutsopoulos [25] designs an optimal auction for
crowdsensing. However, there is no deadline or no limit on
the amount of the work a participant is willing to do or
any location specific tasks. Hence his work is single item
multiple units. Karaliopoulos et.al. [28] and Yang et. al. [26]
consider a setting the same as ours except for the fact that
we offer the flexibility to the ISP to assign MUs a subset
of tasks instead of a complete set of the tasks in which
they show interest. This leads to cost saving to the CSP as
we do not repeat any task more than required. In [28] the
authors design approximate cost minimizing solutions, but
do not consider the strategic behaviour of the participants.
Yang et. al. consider designing a truthful auction for the
settings very similar to ours. However, their goal is to design a
computationally efficient and truthful auction. In our settings,
we allow ISP to allocate an MU any subset of set of tasks in
which it has shown an interest. In addition, we minimize the
total expected payment made by the CSP. Another approach
to offer incentives is fixed rewards rather than auction based
mechanisms. For example. the incentive schemes proposed in
[29], [30], [31], [32]. However, in such settings the MUs are
either overpaid or there is a need for more MUs, since the
payments are less than their actual cost of delivering the task.
For more on game theoretic approaches on incentive design,
the readers are referred to [3].
III. MOBILE CROWDSENSING USING BLOCKCHAIN
CSPs send their requests to the ISP who uses a smart
contract to register the requests and collect the fees from the
CSP for their requests. Then the ISP runs the auction using
another smart contract to provide transparency in the selection
of the proper mobile users. This smart contract forces the MUs
to pay a participation fee that they will lose if they are selected
and not submitted their measurements. Before the auction, the
ISP creates a temporary id for each user in order to preserve
the identity of the MUs. Next, the ISP uses another smart
contract to collect participation proofs from the MUs and pay
them. The MUs will only submit their collected data to the
ISP but they will create a transaction that includes a hash of
their data in order to trigger the smart contracts that pays them.
Also, a fourth smart contract will give access to the CSP to the
collected data. In order to execute this smart contract and get
access to the collected data, the CSP has to transfer as many
credits as the auction cost. The proposed smart contracts can
be managed via mechanisms similar to [33]. Before going into
the details of our proposal, we introduce the used notation.
A. Notation and Assumptions
We consider a set of mobile users (MUs), N , of size |N | =
n, one crowdsensing service provider, CSP, and one Internet
service provider, ISP (the model can be generalized for more
than one CSPs). Whenever the CSP sends a request, CSreq, to
the ISP with deadline D, the ISP maps the request to a set of
tasks T and runs an auction on the appropriate cells. Each cell
Zi ∈ Z is further split into areas zij ∈ Zi. Each mobile user
MUi is associated with a location, li = zjl ∈ Zj ∈ Z and is
able to bid for the set of tasks Ti ⊂ T = {Ti1, Ti2, . . . , Tiki}
that it can deliver based on its current location and using the
proper sensor before D. Each MU successfully completes
a task with probability α. The CSP requires enough MUs
at each location, in order for the probability to successfully
receive the task to be at least β. Given that the mobile users
need to move to the appropriate locations to do the tasks, we
assume that the maximum number of tasks a user can do is
k. The cost for the execution of the first task for MUi is ci1,
for the second task ci2 and so on. We denote its cost vector
by ci ∈ Ci and private information as θi = (ci, Ti), which
is called its type in mechanism design theory. It submits a
bid bi = (cˆi, Tˆi), where cˆi is its reported cost and Tˆi ⊂ Ti
the reported tasks of interest. The ISP collects all the bids
b = (b1, b2, . . . , bn) = (bi, b−i) where b−i represents the
bids from all MUs except MUi. Upon receiving b, ISP
determines the assignments, A(b) = (AT 1,AT 2, . . . ,AT n),
where AT i ⊂ Tˆi is a set of tasks assigned to MUi, and the
payments p(b) = (p1(b), p2(b), . . . , pn(b)). Then, the CSP
is informed about the availability of the requested data.
Let ni =| AT i | denote the number of the tasks that
assigned to MUi. With these, MUi obtains utility ui(·) by
participating in the crowdsensing auction. For given bids b
and true type θi, ui is given by:
ui(b; θi) = pi(b)−
j=ni∑
j=1
cij .
We drop argument b and just use pi, ni whenever it is clear
from the context. We use either bi or (cˆi, Tˆi) based on
convenience in the proof and the same for θi and (ci, Ti).
In our model, we assume that the MUs will not submit their
bids for the tasks they cannot do. This is a valid assumption
and we show how to ensure this using smart contracts. We also
assume that there is enough competition between MUs and
even if we exclude one MU , the request can still be served.
In the next section, we explain the role of the blockchain in
our model and after that, the required smart contracts in order
for the model to be functional.
B. The use of Blockchain
There exist two types of interactions in our model:
1) Conventional: There are three interactions of this type.
(i) The requests from the CSPs that contains the characteristics
of the tasks (SCreq), (ii) the advertisement of the tasks
from the ISP to the MUs and the initiation of the auctions
ADV(T , C), and (iii) the submission of the sensed data from
the mobile users.
2) Blockchain-based: These interactions take the form of
transactions and are stored in the blockchain. Such interactions
require the interacting entities to have an account. Transactions
are the building blocks of blockchains, represent interactions
between two or more entities and are associated with some
data. In its simplest form, a transaction represents the exchange
of money [34], [35] but it can also be used in more complicated
forms, like the one where a mobile user submits a sensor
reading. There are two types of accounts, the externally
owned ones (CSPs, MUs) and the smart contracts. Smart
contracts are special types of accounts, which have a set of
functionalities, are stored on the blockchain, and are uniquely
identifiable. They also have their own storage, which can
be changed whenever they are triggered by a transaction.
Smart contracts allow us to have general purpose computations
on the chain. Whenever such transactions are created, every
miner automatically executes the contract and considers the
data included in the transaction as an input. Then, the whole
blockchain network operates as a distributed virtual machine.
All the remaining interactions belong to this type.
C. Proposed Smart Contracts
Whenever the ISP receives a CSreq , it creates a transaction
which is signed with the public key of the CSP. The transaction
includes the timestamp of the request, the deadline D and
the address of the smart contract called Request Registration
(RR) that the CSP will call after the deadline in order to get
access to the collected data on the external database of the ISP.
Before the deadline, the ISP creates another smart contract,
called Data Access (DA), and stores its address to RR. DA
contains the credentials to the external database where the ISP
stores the collected data. The credentials are encrypted using
the public key of the CSP in order to allow only the CSP that
submitted the request to get access to the collected data. When
the CSP, will trigger RR, it has to create a transaction with
the RR as the destination and in order for the smart contract
to be executed, the CSP has to include enough credits (in the
Ethereum project, these credits are called ether [5]). In this
way, the CSPs have to pay a fee included by the ISP in order
to get the address of DA. Then for the execution of DA, the
CSP will have to pay the amount the ISP paid to the mobile
users after the collection of the data. The ISP is responsible to
store in RR the address of DA and the hash of the collected
data for CSreq . If these two entries are not filled before the
deadline, the RR generates a transaction from the ISP to the
CSP and transfers back the credits.
The ISP, after the reception of CSreq, decides which are
the locations of interest and broadcasts the characteristics of
the tasks to the MUs on these locations (ADV(T , C)). Also,
the ISP creates a temporary account in the blockchain for
each of the MUs that it will be used on for this auction.
Each mobile user, MUi, submits a bid bi = (cˆi, Tˆi) in a
form of a transaction, to express its interest on executing
tasks Tˆi ∈ T , to the blockchain using its temporary address.
All the bids are submitted to the designed smart contract
called Crowdsensing Optimal (CSOPT) that produces a new
Name Type
SCreq Conventional
Request Registration (RR) Blockchain-based
Data Access (DA) Blockchain-based
ADV(T , C) Conventional
Crowdsensing Optimal (CSOPT) Blockchain-based
Submission of Sensed Data Conventional
Mobile User Payment (MUP) Blockchain-based
TABLE I: List of possible interactions among the entities.
For conventional interactions the ISP employs a server that
receives the requests from the CSPs.
CSP ISP Mobile Users
CSreq
ADV(T,C)
Sensed Data
CSOPT
Bids
RR
MUP
DA
Ti
m
e
Temporary IDs
Deadline (D)
Data Hash
Conventional
Smart Contract 
output
Transactions
that trigger 
Smart Contracts
MUP
Fig. 2: Interactions between the crowdsensing service provider,
the Internet service provider and the mobile users.
transaction that contains the task assignment. The optimality
of CSOPT is presented in Section IV. In this way, the ISP is
not able to manipulate the bids, the CSP is also able to verify
the cost of its request and the mobile users are not revealing
their identity. Since each MU needs to transfer certain credits
in order to trigger CSOPT, CSOPT after the production of
the assignment creates a transaction and sends back to the
non selected MUs the credits they spent for the auction. The
selected ones will get their credits back after the completion of
their tasks. If they fail to submit their tasks, they will lose their
credits. Also, CSOPT triggers another contract called Mobile
User Payment (MUP) and stores in it the produced assignment.
Each mobile user that executed one or more tasks, by the end
of these tasks, uploads the data to the external storage of the
ISP and using a hash of them triggers the MUP smart contract
that transfers the payment and the credits used for the calls of
CSOPT and MUP.
Table I lists and Figure 2 depicts the interactions between
the participating entities. Overall, four smart contracts are
used. Two between the ISP and the CSPs and two between the
ISP and the MUs. These contracts guarantee that (i) the CSP
will pay in order to get access to the collected data, (ii) the
mobile users will get paid if they do their tasks and will loose
some credits if they will not, (iii) the identity of the mobile
users can not be revealed to the CSPs. Given that for each
smart contract to be executed a transaction that has its address
as a destination needs to be mined, it is worth mentioning that
we assume that the mining time of a block in the blockchain
is much shorter than the deadline of the crowdsensing request.
D. Desirable Game Theoretic Properties of Auctions
We need the mobile users to report their costs as well as
the tasks they can do truthfully. If the payment scheme is
not designed properly, as indicated in the following example,
MUs can mis-report their bids to earn more money.
Example: Challenges in the design of a truthful auction:
Suppose there are 10 tasks and 3 interested MUs. MU1 can
do all these tasks at $1 per task, MU2 can do only task T10
at $1.5 and MU3 can do all these tasks at $2.5 per task. If
we decide to optimally select the set of MUs and pay them
the first losing bid, all the tasks will be assigned to MU1 who
will be paid $15 since the first losing bid is $1.5 from MU2
for T10. However, MU1 can misreport his bid to be $1 per
task but only for tasks T1 to T9. With this, he will obtain
a payment of $22.5 (2.5*9) since the first losing bid will be
from MU3 for tasks T1 − T9 and MU2 will execute T10 and
earn $2.5. The total cost in this case is $25. Thus a careful
design of the auction is necessary.
If it is a best response for all the MUs to report their private
information truthfully to an auction, we say the auction is
incentive compatible. We study auctions with respect to the
following two notions of incentive compatibility.
(DSIC) Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible: An
auction is called DSIC if reporting truthfully gives every MU
the highest utility regardless of the bids of the other MUs.
(BIC) Bayesian Incentive Compatible: An auction is
called (BIC) if reporting truthfully gives an MU highest
expected utility when the other MUs are truthful, and the
expectation is taken over bids of other MUs.
Apart from incentive compatibility, we also need an auction
to satisfy the individual rationality property.
(IR) Individually Rational: An auction is called Individ-
ually Rational (IR) if no MU derives negative utility by
participating in the auction.
Auctions could be designed with different goals. DSIC is a
strong requirement that may be difficult to achieve. For that,
it is a common approach in the design of auctions to enforce
BIC and IR together with the desirable objective. The most
popular objectives on the design of an auction are the auction
to be Allocatively Efficient or Cost Optimal. An Allocatively
efficient auction allocates the tasks to MUs having the least
costs and achieves a socially good outcome while a cost
optimal auction minimizes the cost incurred by the CSP.
In crowd-sensing, it should be ensured that each task is
completed with probability β or higher. Let r be a repeat
factor, that is, each task is assigned to at least r different
users. The probability that the task is completed by at least
one user is 1 − (1 − α)r ≥ β or equivalently r ≥ log(1−β)log(1−α) .
We use Xij as an indication variable with Xij = 1 if Tj is
assigned to MUi. Any auction on the examined setting needs
to guarantee the following feasibility conditions:∑
iXij ≥ log(1−β)log(1−α) (1)
{Tj | Xij = 1} ⊂ Ti ∀i (2)
With this constraints, we define allocatively efficient (AE)
and cost optimal (CO) auctions as follows.
(AE) Allocatively Efficient Auction: An auction that
chooses assignments that minimize the total cost incurred by
MUs for every reported cost.
Optimal Auction: An auction that chooses assignments
that minimize the total cost paid by the CSP.
DSIC, BIC, IR and AE are formally are formally defined
in Section VIII, while the optimal auction is discussed in the
next Section. In order to design a BIC and IR auction, we
also need to describe the conditions on the allocation rules
and payments.
Truthfulness characterization: Assuming that the cost
per task is constant for all MUs. That is ∀i ∈ N , ci =
(ci, ci, . . . , ci) and ci ∈ Ci = [ci, c¯i]. Let ni =
∑
j Xij(b)
The utility of a mobile user i with bid bi is given as,
ui(bi, b−i; θi) = pi − nici
Ui(bi; θi) = Pi(bi)− ciNi(bi)
where Ni(bi) is the expected number of tasks for MUi
where the expectation is with respect to the bids of the
other agents and Pi(bi) is the expected payment.2 We write,
Pi(bi) = ρi(bi) + cˆiNi(bi), where ρi(bi) is an additional
incentive to report private information truthfully. Thus,
Ui(bi; θi) = ρi(bi)− (ci − cˆi)Ni(bi) (3)
Thus ρi represents the offered utility when all the agents
are truthful. With the above offered incentive, we have the
following theorem.
Theorem 1: An auction is BIC and IR if and only if ∀i ∈ N ,
1) Ni(cˆi, Tˆi) is non-increasing in cˆi∀Tˆi ⊂ Ti.
2) ρi(bi) is non-negative, and non-decreasing in kˆi and ∀ cˆi ∈
[ci, c¯i]
3) ρi(bi) = ρi(c¯i, kˆi) +
∫ ci
cˆi
Ni(z, kˆi)dz
We refer to the above statements as conditions 1, 2 and 3.
Proof: Though the key ideas in the proof are similar
to [24], [22], note that our settings are quite different and we
characterize the results in terms of Nis and not Xijs. We
present the proof in Section IX. 
E. Ensuring the quality of Crowdsensing
It is possible for some malicious mobile users to misreport
the sensed data and affect their overall quality. This makes
the building of a reputation system and a careful integration
of reports in the final data necessary. There have been various
approaches, such as in [36], [37], proposed in the literature
2In general, the design of an optimal auction calls for designing the expected
assignment and the expected payments for every user and every possible bid.
to limit the influence of low quality reporting. In particular,
the Community Sensing Influence Limiter (CSIL) proposed
by Radanovic and Faltings [36] is the most suitable for our
setting. In CSIL, each MUi has a reputation score ρi and data
is added to the collected data with probability ρiρi+1 . Thus, the
influence of a malicious user on the aggregated data becomes
limited. To build reputation scores, the ISP deploys certain
trusted MUs across all cells. These MUs always perform the
tasks assigned with honesty. Whenever, the ISP receives the
data from trusted MUs, it updates the reputation score of each
MU who has reported data for that time slot. The reputation
score update function captures how much the data supplied by
MU adds a value to the collected data.
F. Attack model and Defense
In order to justify that our proposal preserves users’ identi-
ties and location privacy, we design an attack from a CSP that
wants to find them and we explain how it fails. In order for
CSPs to identify the sensitive locations (home/work) of mobile
users, they need to submit requests with short deadlines at
times that they expect the participants to be at such locations.
However, the ISP assigns a different temporary id to each
participant every time. Even if the CSP submits the same
request multiple times with a short deadline in a limited
geographic area and even if it is always the same participant
that completes the request, the ISP will preserve her privacy
since she will be assigned a different randomly selected id
every time. If the id is of the same length as the addresses in
Ethereum (64 bytes), the range of the possible ids is [1, 2512].
IV. CROWDSENSING OPTIMAL AUCTION
For optimal request assignments, the true costs from the
MUs are needed and hence we use mechanism design theory
to design auctions [3], [38], [39]. The goal can either be to
minimize the cost incurred by the mobile users (AE auction)
or to minimize the expected payment of the CSP (cost optimal
auction). Note that, the CSP’s goal is not to care about game
theoretic property, AE, but to minimize its cost of such crowd
sensing activity. Thus, we need to design a cost optimal
auction for the CSP. In the examined setting, the mobile users
bid for a certain set of desirable tasks and may get assigned its
subset. In auction theory, this is called combinatorial auctions.
Designing optimal combinatorial auctions for general settings
is an open problem. However, there have been different at-
tempts for specific settings [40], [41], [42]. The key difference
between [40], [41] and our settings is, in their paper a mobile
user either assigned the set of tasks he is interested in or
nothing where as in our settings, the mobile user may get
subset of its desirable tasks. In [42], the mobile user needs to
submit capcity, that is how many tasks he can perform and the
auction may assign any set of tasks not exceeding his capcity.
In addition to combinatorial setting, we need to assign each
task to multiple users to ensure high assurance on completion
of tasks which is not addressed in the literature. Thus, the
auction we design is categorized as an optimal multi-unit
combinatorial auction. In general the characterization of an
optimal combinatorial auction is an open problem. We leverage
from the fact that although our setting is combinatorial, the
tasks are homogeneous except from their locations. That is, a
mobile user is indifferent to any constant size subset of tasks
within its interested set of tasks. For example, a MU who is
interested in tasks T1, T2, T3, T4, incurs the same cost if it is
assigned T1, T2 or T3, T4 or any two of these fours tasks.
We start designing an optimal auction with game theoretic
properties BIC and IR. With our BIC and IR characterization
result, we provide sufficient conditions for an auction to be
an optimal auction in our context. Next, we study the concept
of Regularity and prove that the optimal auction we have
designed is also AE under regularity. Then we design a
payment rule which along with AE allocation rule qualifies
to be an optimal auction. The proposed payment rule offers
difference between the cost of AE auction with their presence
and absence as incentives to report their costs truthfully. That
is if the cost of a MU is $5 and the AE cost increases
in his absence by $2, it is paid $7. We design an efficient
allocation rule to determine allocation rule satisfying AE
property (Algorithm 1, subroutine ALLOC-RULE). We call
the proposed auction as CSOPT. Note that, though we set
the goal to design an optimal auction with BIC and IR as
constraints, CSOPT along with cost optimality also satisfies
AE and DSIC.
A. CSOPT: Cost Optimal Mobile Crowdsensing Auction
An auction is called optimal, for CSP, if it minimizes the
total expected payment to the MUs, is BIC and IR and is
feasible [22]. That is:
minimize Eb
∑
i∈N pi(b)
subject to: BIC Ui(ci, Ti; θi) ≥ Ui(bi; θi)∀ci,∀Ti
IR Ui(ci, Ti; θi) ≥ 0
FEASIBILITY
∑
iXij ≥ log(1−β)log(1−α)
FEASIBILITY {Tj | Xij = 1} ⊂ Ti ∀i
Let Fi(ci|ki) and fi(ci|ki) denote respectively the cumulative
distribution and probability density function of cost (ci) of
MUi given the number of tasks it can perform.
Theorem 2: Suppose the allocation rule minimizes
n∑
i=1
∫ c¯1
c1
. . .
∫ c¯n
cn
(
ci +
Fi(ci|ki)
fi(ci|ki)
)
ni(ci, ki, c−i, k−i)
f1(c1, k1) . . . fn(cn, kn) dc1 . . . dcndk1dk2 . . . dkn (4)
∀ki subject to conditions 1 and 2 of Theorem 1, Equation (1)
and Equation (2). Also, suppose the payment is given by
Pi(ci, ki) = ciNi(ci, ki) +
∫ ci
ci
Ni(z, ki)dz (5)
then such a payment scheme and allocation scheme constitute
an optimal auction satisfying BIC and IR.
Proof: The proof is given in Section IX. 
Algorithm 1: CSOPT
Input: N , T , cˆ, (Tˆi)i∈N , r
Output: Allocations A = (AT 1,AT 2, . . . ,AT n) and
Payments P = {p1, p2, . . . , pn}.
Allocations:
T ← rT // Make r copies of each task in T
A = ALLOC-RULE(N , T , cˆ, (Ti)i∈N )
[p1, p2, . . . , pn] = PAYMENT-RULE(N , T , cˆ, (Ti)i∈N ,A)
Subroutine: ALLOC-RULE(N˚ , T˚ , c˚, (T˚i)i∈N˚ ) ;
Input: 〈N˚ , T˚ , c˚, (T˚i)i∈N˚ 〉
Output: Vector A = (AT 1,AT 2, . . . ,AT n) tasks
assigned to each MU .
while T˚ 6= ∅ do
Sort MUs based on cost per task for tasks in T˚
Add the most economic MU , say MUi to the
selected MUs
ATi = T˚ ∩ T˚i
T˚ ← T˚ − ATi
A = (AT1,AT2, . . . ,ATn)
Subroutine: PAYMENT-RULE(N , T , cˆ, (Ti)i∈N ,A) ;
Input: 〈N , T , cˆ, (Ti)i∈N ,A〉
Output: Vector P of payments of each agent.
fcost = COST(A)
// COST finds out the cost of allocation A
for j ∈ N do
A˚j=ALLOC-RULE(N \ {j}, T , c−j , (Tˆi)i∈N\{j})
scost=COST(A˚j)
pj= nj × cj + scost-fcost
(Regularity): We define the virtual cost function as
Hi(ci, ki) := ci +
Fi(ci|ki)
fi(ci|ki) ,∀MUi ∈ N
We say that a type distribution is regular if ∀i, Hi is non-
decreasing in ci and non-increasing in ki. Analogous to the
literature on optimal auctions [24], [22], we assume regularity
on our distribution type. We assume the type distributions
satisfy regularity and all the MU types are independently
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) over [cl, cu] × [kl, cu]. We
make a further assumption that the costs for all MUs are
identically distributed. With these assumptions, we present the
pseudocode of CSOPT in Algorithm 1.
Observation 1: Under the assumption of regularity and i.i.d.
MUs, an allocatively efficient auction is an optimal solution
to Equation (4) and maximizes Equation (4) for each b.
Observation 2: Under the assumption of regularity and
i.i.d. MUs, for a fixed b−i, the following payment satisfies
Equation (5).
pi(ci, ki, b−i) = cini(ci, ki, b−i) +
∫ c
ci
ni(z, ki, b−i)dz (6)
Since we are using an AE allocation, the payment (6) can be
written as:
pi() = cini(ci, ki, b−i) + V ∗−i − V ∗
where V ∗ is the cost of AE allocation and V ∗−i is the cost
of AE allocation if MUi is not in the system. Observe that,
keeping b−i fixed, whenever MUi increases its cost, either
ni() remains the same or drops by some integer until it goes
to zero. Let us assume ci < ci1 < . . . cil < c are the costs at
which ni drops. Since we assume there is enough competition,
eventually it should drop to zero that is ni(cil, ki.b−i) = 0.
Precisely ci1, ci2, . . . .cil are the costs which get added into an
AE allocation when MUi is not there in the system.
With all the above discussion, we propose our mechanism
CSOPT as given in Algorithm 1. COST(A) returns the total
cost of allocating tasks as described in A. Hence scost
captures the total cost incurred by MUj in optimal allocation.
Lemma 3: CSOPT is an AE auction for the CSP.
Proof: By construction, it satisfies FEASIBILITY conditions.
We need to show that it minimizes the total allocation
cost. Let Ae be an AE allocation given bids as b. Let
MU1,MU2, . . . be the order in which CSOPT allocates the
tasks to MUs. Let MUi be the first MU whose allocation
in CSOPT differs from that of in Ae. Thus at least one of
its tasks is assigned to MUj j > i. However, ci ≤ cj . Thus
not awarding all ni() tasks to MUi which are allocated by
CSOPT the cost is not going to improve. Using induction,
it follows that no allocation Ae can improve on cost of
allocation over CSOPT. 
Theorem 4: CSOPT is an optimal auction for the CSP.
Proof: It follows from Observations 1,2, Lemma 3 and
Theorem 2. 
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We conduct two set of experiments to depict the quality of
our proposal. First, we compare the cost of the proposed auc-
tion with another state-of the-art algorithm. Next, we examine
the time needs of the architecture to process crowdsensing
requests. Figure 3 shows the results from the first set of
experiments and Figure 4 of the second.
CSOPT: Since we have proved mathematically that CSOPT
is allocatively efficient we only need to compare the cost of the
allocations it produces with other state-of-the-art algorithms.
For that we selected [28] because it adopts to our scenario
and it is also fast in terms of time since it operates in a
greedy manner. The authors named their algorithm greedy
heuristic for selection under stochastic user mobility, but here
we refer to it as GSSUM for short. We consider an area that
is composed by a 100 by 100 grid and we randomly place
mobile users on this grid. Then we generate crowdsensing
requests with deadlines and we assume that each user bids for
a task only if it is within a certain distance. Each user has a
cost per allocated task in a range between 50 and 100. Figure
3a shows, in logarithmic scale, that the total cost (payments
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Fig. 3: Performance evaluation of CSOPT and comparison with GSSUM algorithm that was proposed by the authors of [28].
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to the MUs) of CSOPT is decreasing as the number of MUs
is increasing. This result is expected because the increased
competition between MUs decreases the cost per task. On
the other hand, the GSSUM algorithm operates in the opposite
way because whenever it selects a mobile user to assign a task
to, it assigns all the tasks on which she has a bid.
Next, we compare the two algorithms in terms of the number
of requests. Figure 3b shows that CSOPT is at least one order
of magnitude less costly while the cost in both algorithms is
increasing at the same rate. Next, in Figure 3c we show how
the costs increase when the number of requests reaches 200 but
there is a repeat factor r = [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] that ensures that the
requests will be satisfied, as explained in Section III-D. This
case differs from the previous one because the requests are
less disseminated throughout the whole area and the average
number of the participants that can handle a request is much
smaller. r in Figures 3a and 3b is 1.
Architecture: We install Ethereum in a Desktop with Intel
Core i7-7700 CPU @ 3.60 GHz and 16 GB of RAM. We
then measure the time required for a block to be mined for
different values of mining difficulty and the time requirements
of CSOPT. Figure 4 depicts these measurements. In order
to produce Figure 4a we set the mining difficulty on the
genesis file of Ethereum and wait for 100 blocks to be mined.
Small values of mining difficulty can produce a new block
every few millisecond but this will produce the generation
of many empty blocks that are a waste of storage. For the
time measurements of CSOPT for different numbers of MUs
and crowdsensing requests, we implement the algorithm and
measured its performance on the same desktop. Figure 4b
shows that the time CSOPT needs to determine the task
assignment and the payments increases with the number of
requests and MUs. However, it does not require more than
10 seconds in the case of 1000 MUs and 1000 tasks. We
denote the time requirements of CSOPT with tCSOPT and
the mining time of a block by tB .
These experiments are important since all the blockchain-
based interactions as described in Section III-B will have this
delay. In total, any request from a CSP needs: 1 block to be
mined in order to register the request (RR) while in parallel
the ISP contacts the mobile users and announces the tasks
(tann). If the announcement time takes more time than the
mining of RR, the mining time of this block can be ignored.
Next, the users bid for a predefined time period (tbidding) and
after that the CSOPT is triggered, whose termination triggers
MUP. If the crowdsensing task duration ttask is longer than
tB , the mining of the block that is caused by the MUP is not
counted in the total delay. By the end of the task execution,
the users submit the collected data and DA is triggered after
tB notifies the CSP that the data have been collected. The total
delay between the submission of the request and the access to
the collected data is:
max(tB , tann) + tbidding + tCSOPT + max(tB , ttask) + tB .
From this set of experiments we can conclude that if the
duration of the crowdsensing tasks is in the order of tens of
seconds the time overhead of using a blockchain instead of a
centralised server is negligible while the benefits in terms of
preserving the users privacy are high.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we proposed a novel architecture for event-
based spatial crowdsensing tasks that is deployed by an ISP
and is based on blockchain technology. The proposed archi-
tecture employs smart contracts (i) that allow crowdsensing
service providers to submit their requests, (ii) to run a cost-
optimal auction for the determination of the most suitable
mobile users that are interested in executing the crowdsensing
tasks, (iii) to deal with the payments for the mobile users
and (iv) to give access to the crowdsensing provider. The
proposed architecture preserves the privacy of the mobile users
in the sense that the crowdsensing provider cannot know their
identity and can not derive their sensitive information such as
the location of their home/work. Moreover, we have shown
that the employed incentive compatible cost optimal auction
that determines the selection of the mobile users that will
handle each crowdsensing task, outperforms state of the art
proposals when adopted to the examined setting by one order
of magnitude for high numbers of mobile users and tasks.
VII. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This research has been supported, in part, by projects
26211515 and 16214817 from the Research Grants Council
of Hong Kong.
REFERENCES
[1] R. K. Ganti, N. Pham, H. Ahmadi, S. Nangia, and T. F. Abdelzaher,
“Greengps: A participatory sensing fuel-efficient maps application,” in
Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Mobile Systems,
Applications, and Services, ser. MobiSys ’10. New York, NY, USA:
ACM, 2010, pp. 151–164.
[2] T. Yan, B. Hoh, D. Ganesan, K. Tracton, T. Iwuchukwu, and J.-S.
Lee, “Crowdpark: A crowdsourcing-based parking reservation system
for mobile phones,” Univ. of Massachusetts Amherst Tech. Report, 2011.
[3] N. Nisan, “Introduction to mechanism design (for computer scientists),”
in Algorithmic game theory, V. V. Vazirani, N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden,
and . Tardos, Eds. Oxford University Press, 2007, ch. 9, pp. 209–242.
[4] European Commission, “Code of EU Online Rights,” https://ec.europa.
eu/digital-single-market/en/code-eu-online-rights, accessed April 2018.
[5] G. Wood, “Ethereum: A secure decentralised generalised transaction
ledger,” Ethereum Project Yellow Paper, vol. 151, 2014.
[6] A. Kosba, A. Miller, E. Shi, Z. Wen, and C. Papamanthou, “Hawk:
The blockchain model of cryptography and privacy-preserving smart
contracts,” in 2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), May
2016, pp. 839–858.
[7] C. Cachin, “Architecture of the hyperledger blockchain fabric,” in
Workshop on Distributed Cryptocurrencies and Consensus Ledgers,
2016.
[8] D. Chatzopoulos, M. Ahmadi, S. Kosta, and P. Hui, “Flopcoin: A cryp-
tocurrency for computation offloading,” IEEE Transactions on Mobile
Computing, vol. 17, no. 5, pp. 1062–1075, May 2018.
[9] D. Chatzopoulos, S. Gujar, B. Faltings, and P. Hui, “Localcoin: An
ad-hoc payment scheme for areas with high connectivity: Poster,” in
Proceedings of the 17th ACM International Symposium on Mobile Ad
Hoc Networking and Computing, ser. MobiHoc ’16, 2016, pp. 365–366.
[10] V. Buterin et al., “A next-generation smart contract and decentralized
application platform,” white paper, 2014.
[11] S. Hu, C. Cai, Q. Wang, C. Wang, X. Luo, and K. Ren, “Searching
an encrypted cloud meets blockchain: A decentralized, reliable and fair
realization.”
[12] J. Hightower and G. Borriello, “Location systems for ubiquitous com-
puting,” Computer, vol. 34, no. 8, pp. 57–66, Aug 2001.
[13] N. O. Tippenhauer, C. Po¨pper, K. B. Rasmussen, and S. Capkun, “On
the requirements for successful gps spoofing attacks,” in Proceedings of
the 18th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security,
ser. CCS ’11. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2011, pp. 75–86.
[14] J. Yang, Y. Chen, and W. Trappe, “Detecting spoofing attacks in mobile
wireless environments,” in 2009 6th Annual IEEE Communications
Society Conference on Sensor, Mesh and Ad Hoc Communications and
Networks, June 2009, pp. 1–9.
[15] L. Pournajaf, D. A. Garcia-Ulloa, L. Xiong, and V. Sunderam, “Par-
ticipant privacy in mobile crowd sensing task management: A survey
of methods and challenges,” SIGMOD Rec., vol. 44, no. 4, pp. 23–34,
2016.
[16] J. Krumm, “Inference attacks on location tracks,” Pervasive computing,
pp. 127–143, 2007.
[17] S. Gambs, M.-O. Killijian, and M. N. del Prado Cortez, “De-
anonymization attack on geolocated data,” Journal of Computer and
System Sciences, vol. 80, no. 8, pp. 1597–1614, 2014.
[18] R. K. Ganti, F. Ye, and H. Lei, “Mobile crowdsensing: current state and
future challenges,” IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 49, no. 11,
2011.
[19] M.-R. Ra, B. Liu, T. L. Porta, and R. Govindan, “Medusa: A Program-
ming Framework for Crowd-Sensing Applications,” in Proceedings of
the 10th International Conference on Mobile Systems, Applications, and
Services (MobiSys’12), June 2012.
[20] G. Merlino, S. Arkoulis, S. Distefano, C. Papagianni, A. Puliafito, and
S. Papavassiliou, “Mobile crowdsensing as a service: A platform for
applications on top of sensing clouds,” Future Generation Computer
Systems, vol. 56, pp. 623 – 639, 2016.
[21] C. H. Liu, P. Hui, J. W. Branch, C. Bisdikian, and B. Yang, “Efficient
network management for context-aware participatory sensing,” in 2011
8th Annual IEEE Communications Society Conference on Sensor, Mesh
and Ad Hoc Communications and Networks, June 2011, pp. 116–124.
[22] R. B. Myerson, “Optimal auction design,” Mathematics of operations
research, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 58–73, 1981.
[23] Y. Cai, C. Daskalakis, and S. M. Weinberg, “An algorithmic characteri-
zation of multi-dimensional mechanisms,” in Proceedings of the Forty-
fourth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, ser. STOC
’12. ACM, 2012, pp. 459–478.
[24] G. Iyengar and A. Kumar, “Optimal procurement mechanisms for
divisible goods with capacitated suppliers,” Review of Economic Design,
vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 129–154, 2008.
[25] I. Koutsopoulos, “Optimal incentive-driven design of participatory sens-
ing systems,” in IEEE Infocom, 2013, pp. 1402–1410.
[26] D. Yang, G. Xue, X. Fang, and J. Tang, “Incentive mechanisms for
crowdsensing: Crowdsourcing with smartphones,” IEEE/ACM Trans.
Netw., vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 1732–1744, Jun. 2016.
[27] D. Zhao, X. Y. Li, and H. Ma, “How to crowdsource tasks truthfully
without sacrificing utility: Online incentive mechanisms with budget
constraint,” in IEEE INFOCOM 2014 - IEEE Conference on Computer
Communications, April 2014, pp. 1213–1221.
[28] M. Karaliopoulos, O. Telelis, and I. Koutsopoulos, “User recruitment for
mobile crowdsensing over opportunistic networks,” in IEEE INFOCOM,
April 2015, pp. 2254–2262.
[29] G. Goel, A. Nikzad, and A. Singla, “Allocating tasks to workers with
matching constraints: Truthful mechanisms for crowdsourcing markets,”
in Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on World Wide Web,
ser. WWW ’14 Companion, 2014, pp. 279–280.
[30] S. Bhattacharya, G. Goel, S. Gollapudi, and K. Munagala, “Budget
constrained auctions with heterogeneous items,” in Proceedings of the
Forty-second ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, ser. STOC ’10.
New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2010, pp. 379–388.
[31] G. Radanovic, B. Faltings, and R. Jurca, “Incentives for Effort in
Crowdsourcing using the Peer Truth Serum,” Acm Transactions on
Intelligent Systems and Technology, vol. 7, no. 4, July 2016.
[32] G. Radanovic and B. Faltings, “Learning to Scale Payments in Crowd-
sourcing with PropeRBoost,” in Proceedings of the Fourth AAAI confer-
ence on Conference on Human Computation and Crowdsourcing, 2016.
[33] Y.-C. Hu, T.-T. Lee, D. Chatzopoulos, and P. Hui, “Hierarchical in-
teractions between ethereum smart contracts across testnets,” in Pro-
ceedings of the 1st Workshop on Cryptocurrencies and Blockchains for
Distributed Systems, ser. CryBlock’18, 2018, pp. 7–12.
[34] S. Nakamoto, “Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system,” 2009.
[Online]. Available: http://www.bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf
[35] F. Tschorsch and B. Scheuermann, “Bitcoin and beyond: A technical
survey on decentralized digital currencies,” IEEE Communications Sur-
veys Tutorials, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 2084–2123, thirdquarter 2016.
[36] G. Radanovic and B. Faltings, “Limiting the influence of low quality
information in community sensing,” in Proceedings of the 2016 Inter-
national Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems, ser.
AAMAS ’16, 2016, pp. 873–881.
[37] P. Resnick and R. Sami, “The influence limiter: Provably manipulation-
resistant recommender systems,” in Proceedings of ACM RecSys, 2007,
pp. 25–32.
[38] D. Garg, Y. Narahari, and S. Gujar, “Foundations of mechanism design:
A tutorial part 1-key concepts and classical results,” Sadhana, vol. 33,
no. 2, pp. 83–130, 2008.
[39] ——, “Foundations of mechanism design: A tutorial part 2-advanced
concepts and results,” Sadhana, vol. 33, no. 2, pp. 131–174, 2008.
[40] S. Gujar and Y. Narahari, “Optimal multi-unit combinatorial auctions
with single minded bidders,” in Commerce and Enterprise Computing,
2009. CEC’09. IEEE Conference on. IEEE, 2009, pp. 74–81.
[41] ——, “Optimal multi-unit combinatorial auctions,” Operational Re-
search, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 27–46, 2013.
[42] S. Bhat, S. Jain, S. Gujar, and Y. Narahari, “An optimal bidimensional
multi-armed bandit auction for multi-unit procurement,” in Proceedings
of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Mul-
tiagent Systems. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and
Multiagent Systems, 2015, pp. 1789–1790.
VIII. FORMAL DEFINITIONS
Definition 1: (Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible):
An auction is called Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible
(DSIC) if reporting truthfully gives every MU the highest
utility regardless of the bids of the other MUs.
Formally, ∀i ∈ N, ∀ci, cˆi ∈ Ci∀Tˆi ⊂ Ti, ∀b−i,
ui(ci, Ti,b−i; θi) ≥ ui(cˆi, Tˆi,b−i; θi).
Definition 2: (Bayesian Incentive Compatible):
An auction is called Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC)
if reporting truthfully gives an MU highest expected utility
when the other MUs are truthful, and the expectation is taken
over bids of other MUs.
Formally, ∀i ∈ N ,∀cˆi, ci,
Ui(ci, Ti; θi) ≥ Ui(cˆi, Tˆi; θi),
where, Ui(bi; θi) = Eb−i [ui(bi,b−i; θi)].
Definition 3: (Individually Rational):
An auction is called Individually Rational (IR) if no MU
derives negative utility by participating in the auction.
Formally, ∀i ∈ N, ∀ci ∈ Ci, Ti ⊂ T ,
ui(ci, Ti,b−i; ci, Ti) ≥ 0
Definition 4: (Allocatively Efficient (AE) Auction):
If an auction chooses assignments that minimize the total
cost incurred by MUs for every reported cost, we call it an
allocatively efficient (AE) auction.
That is, ∀c the auction assigns tasks such that:
minimize
X
∑
i∈N
∑j=k
j=1 cijXij (7)
subject to
∑
iXij ≥ log(1−β)log(1−α) (8)
{Tj | Xij = 1} ⊂ Ti ∀i (9)
and each task is assigned to at least r different mobile users.
IX. PROOFS
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof: To prove the necessity part of the theorem, we first
observe due to BIC we have,
Ui(cˆi, kˆi; ci, ki) ≤ Ui(ci, ki; ci, ki) ∀(cˆi, kˆi) and (ci, ki)
=⇒ Ui(cˆi, ki; ci, ki) ≤ Ui(ci, ki; ci, ki)
Without loss of generality, we assume cˆi > ci Rearrangement
of these terms yields,
Ui(cˆi, ki; ci, ki) = Ui(cˆi, ki; cˆi, ki) + (cˆi − ci)Ni(cˆi, ki),
which implies that,
Ui(cˆi, ki; cˆi, ki)− Ui(ci, ki; ci, ki)
cˆi − ci ≤ −Ni(cˆi, ki).
Similarly using Ui(ci, ki; cˆi, ki) ≤ Ui(cˆi, ki; cˆi, ki),
−Ni(ci, ki) ≤ Ui(cˆi, ki; cˆi, ki)− Ui(ci, ki; ci, ki)
cˆi − ci
≤ −Ni(cˆi, ki). (10)
Taking limit cˆi → ci, we get,
∂Ui(ci, ki; ci, ki)
∂ci
= −Ni(ci, ki). (11)
Equation (10) implies, Ni(ci, ki) is non-increasing in ci. This
proves condition 1 of the theorem in the forward direction.
When the worker bids truthfully, from Equation (3),
ρi(ci, ki) = Ui(ci, ki; ci, ki). (12)
For BIC, Equation (11) should be true. So,
ρi(ci, ki) = ρi(c¯i, ki) +
∫ c¯i
ci
Ni(z, ki)dz (13)
This proves condition 3 of the theorem. BIC also requires,
ki ∈ argmaxkˆiUi(ci, kˆi; ci, ki) ∀ ci ∈ [ci, c¯i]
This implies, ∀ci, ρi(ci, ki) should be non-decreasing in ki.
The IR conditions (Equation(12)) imply
ρi(ci, ki) ≥ 0.
This proves condition 2 of the theorem. Thus, these three
conditions are necessary for BIC and IR properties. We now
prove the sufficiency. Consider
Ui(ci, ki; ci, ki) = ρi(ci, ki) ≥ 0.
So the IR property is satisfied. Without loss of generality, we
assume cˆi > ci. The proof is similar for the case cˆi < ci.
Ui(bi; ci, ki)
= ρi(cˆi, kˆi) + (cˆi − ci)Ni(cˆi, kˆi) (By Defn)
= ρi(c¯i, kˆi) +
∫ c¯i
cˆi
Ni(z, kˆi)dz + (cˆi − ci)Ni(cˆi, kˆi)
(By hypothesis)
= ρi(c¯i, kˆi) +
∫ c¯i
ci
Ni(z, kˆi)dz
−
∫ cˆi
ci
Ni(z, kˆi)dz + (cˆi − ci)Ni(cˆi, kˆi)
≤ ρi(ci, kˆi) (Ni is non-increasing in ci)
≤ ρi(ci, ki) ( as ρi is non-decreasing in ki)
= Ui(ci, ki; ci, ki)

B. Proof of the Theorem 2
Proof: The auctioneer’s objective is to maximize her expected
utility subject to conditions BIC, IR, and Feasibility. Her
objective function is:
n∑
i=1
∫ c¯1
c1
. . .
∫ c¯n
cn
∫ k¯1
k1
. . .
∫ k¯n
kn
[− pi(b)]
f1(c1, k1) . . . fn(cn, kn)dc1 . . . dcn dk1 . . . dkn
=
n∑
i=1
∫ c¯1
c1
. . .
∫ c¯n
cn
∫ k¯1
k1
. . .
∫ k¯n
kn
[
(−ci + ci)ni(ci, ki, c−i, k−i)− pi(b)
]
f1(c1, k1) . . . fn(cn, kn)dc1 . . . dcn dk1 . . . dkn
=
n∑
i=1
∫ c¯1
c1
. . .
∫ c¯n
cn
∫ k¯1
k1
. . .
∫ k¯n
kn
(− cini(ci, ki, c−i, k−i))
f1(c1, k1) . . . fn(cn, kn)dc1 . . . dcn dk1 . . . dkn
+
n∑
i=1
∫ c¯1
c1
. . .
∫ c¯n
cn
∫ k¯1
k1
. . .
∫ k¯n
kn
(
cini(ci, ki, c−i, k−i)− pi(b)
)
f1(c1, k1) . . . fn(cn, kn) dc1 . . . dcn dk1 . . . dkn (14)
The first term of Equation (14) is already same as first term
in desired form of objective function of auctioneer given in
Equation (4). We now use conditions (1) and (3) of Theorem
1 to arrive at the result.∫ c¯1
c1
. . .
∫ c¯n
cn
∫ k¯1
k1
. . .
∫ k¯n
kn
(
cini(.)− pi(b)
)
f1(c1, k1) . . . fn(cn, kn)dc1 . . . dcn dk1 . . . dkn
= −
∫ k¯i
ki
∫ c¯i
ci
ρi(ci, ki)fi(ci, qi)dci dki
(Integrating out b−i)
= −
∫ k¯i
ki
∫ c¯i
ci
(
ρi(c¯i, ki) +
∫ c¯i
ci
Ni(z, ki)dz
)
fi(ci, ki)dci dki
(As we need truthfulness)
= −
∫ k¯i
ki
∫ c¯i
ci
ρi(c¯i, ki)fi(ci, ki)dci dki
−
∫ k¯i
ki
∫ c¯i
ci
Ni(z, ki)dz
∫ z
ci
fi(ci|ki)dci fi(ki)dki
(Changing order of integration)
= −
∫ k¯i
ki
∫ c¯i
ci
ρi(c¯i, ki)fi(ci, ki)dci dki
−
∫ k¯i
ki
∫ c¯i
ci
Ni(z, ki)Fi(z|ki)dzfi(ki)dki
= −
∫ k¯i
ki
∫ c¯i
ci
ρi(c¯i, ki)fi(ci, ki)dci dki
−
∫ k¯i
ki
∫ c¯i
ci
Ni(z, ki)
Fi(ci|ki)
fi(ci|ki) fi(ci, ki)dz dki (15)
The last step is obtained by relabeling the variable of
integration and simplifying.
Here, ρi(c¯i, ki) denotes the utility of a MUi when its
true type is (c¯i, ki). With this type profile, the auctioneer
by paying c¯i can ensure both IR and IC, hence we can set
ρi(c¯i, ki) = 0,∀ki ∈ [ki, k¯i]. Applying this in the above
equation and simplifying we get that the objective function
of auctioneer is same in form to Equation (4). Consider
Equation (15) and set ρi(c¯i, ki) = 0 and simplification yields
Equation (5). By construction, the mechanism is BIC and IR.
By hypothesis, as the auctioneer’s objective is maximized,
the mechanism is optimal. 
